One of the most essential arguments made by proponents of a universal basic income (UBI) is that it will ensure dignity and self-determination. More time could be spent on social engagement if less time had to be spent on securing one's own livelihood.
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work.
3 If the illusion of arbitrary scalability of individual earnings prevents a signifi cant portion of the population, across all classes, from recognising that this is a scam due to the fi nancing gap, it should not be surprising that people are equally receptive to a UBI's promises of winning. At least there is no reason to assume fraudulent intent. This may explain the widespread sympathy for the UBI concept. For example, during a referendum in June 2016, a fi fth of the Swiss electorate voted in favour of introducing a UBI, although it seems likely that only a minority of these supporters would have been able to provide a consistent answer to the fi nancing question.
Whether winning the lottery would actually make people as perpetually happy as they expect is also questionable. Numerous studies prove that the joy of winning is rather shortlived. 4 In the long run, lottery winners' satisfaction with life is slightly higher than before winning, but much lower than people imagined before winning. 5 What is known as the "joy of anticipation" is also referred to as impact bias in social psychology, and it constitutes one of the many cognitive distortions of human perception. 6 The same applies to universal basic income.
False income promises
Undoubtedly, the most important question is how to pay for universal basic income. The answer depends largely on the details of how it will be provided. However, its proponents often prefer to remain silent on such fi ne points. The Swiss referendum is one of the few exceptions. It posed the question of whether every adult should receive a monthly contribution of 2,500 Swiss francs (€2,300) and every minor 625 Swiss francs 3 These are not isolated instances, and such thinking can essentially trigger mass movements. In 1997 scammers in Albania were able to convince a signifi cant portion of the population to trust them with their money by promising incredible returns. When the bubble burst, massive unrest followed; see Zinsen aus der Kristallkugel, in: Der Spiegel, No. 6, 3 February 1997 (€575). 7 Even for wealthy Switzerland, fi nancing such a programme would be a challenge that could only be met through drastic tax increases. Proponents therefore resorted to a euphemistic trick. They calculated that most Swiss citizens were already at this income level or above. Instead of raising income taxes and in return providing taxpayers with a UBI, they just decided that part of one's earnings would be reclassifi ed as universal basic income.
8 Income subject to the demanding conditions of actually working for it would thereby become UBI by declaration. Those affected can therefore hope to increase their subjective well-being by simply changing the label of their income.
One could also say that the pretention of increasing individual wealth was used in order to sell the introduction of a negative income tax. For the vast majority of the population, this would not produce any net gains, since the increased tax burden would more or less cancel out basic income. Top-level earners would witness drastic net income declines, since their tax burdens would be greater than their claims to basic income. The only benefi ciaries would be low-income earners and welfare recipients. Their incomes would automatically be raised to the basic income level. Welfare recipients able to work would also no longer have to prove that they are trying to fi nd work in order to maintain their benefi t claims.
7 Basic Income Earth Network -Switzerland: Eidgenössische Volksinitiative «Für ein bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen», 10 December 2014, available at http://bien.ch/sites/bien/fi les/pdf/eidgenoessische_volksinitiative_fuer_ein_bedingungsloses_grundeinkommen_BI-ENch2014.pdf. 8 Ibid., p. 19: "128 billion -transfer from value-creation equal to the basic income of work-related income." (Author's translation) 128 billion Swiss francs make up approximately 2/3 of the entire fi nancing need, and the description "transfer from value-creation equal to the basic income of work-related income" means nothing other than relabeling work-related income as universal basic income. 
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False incentives
The following charts illustrate the effects of a hypothetical monthly basic income of €1,000 in a stylised manner. Figure 1 shows the initial situation. Available net income increases with the number of monthly working hours, assuming an hourly wage of €15 and a tax and contribution rate of 30%. Every combination of income and working hours has a specifi c utility, though trade-offs should be considered. While additional income from additional hours worked produces positive benefi ts, the loss of leisure is a negative consequence. Optimal conditions are achieved when benefi ts through additional income are exactly balanced by the effects of loss of leisure. In Figure 1 , this occurs at 40 working hours per week. The curved line is an indifference curve that includes all points that create the same utility for the combination of income and leisure as the optimal working hours. Figure 2 demonstrates the effects of introducing a UBI of €1,000 per month. The lines for gross and net income shift upwards in parallel, i.e. fi nancing needs are not included. Benefi ts increase greatly compared to the initial situation. However, optimal working hours shift to the left, i.e. it becomes benefi cial to work less than before. This is represented in the fi gure by the indifference curve for optimal working hours (24 hours per week in the example) lying above the indifference curve for full-time employment. This is due to the so-called income effect that results from the declining marginally added utility of each additional euro as one's income grows. In other words, the more income one already has, the lower the benefi ts of additional income.
But if we consider the fi nancing needs of UBI -for example, by increasing income taxes -the net income curve fl attens dramatically. Figure 3 shows a case that results in the same net income for a full-time employee as under the status quo, i.e. additional taxes are as high for full-time employment as for UBI. Changes to income would occur anyway through changes to behaviour. This is because the fl attening of the net income curve reduces the benefi ts of additional income in relation to hours worked so strongly that working full-time is no longer benefi cial. The optimal number of working hours is now close to zero for income slightly above the UBI level. Financing needs would increase to the same extent to which such behavioural changes would occur, since people who do not work also do not pay taxes.
UBI proponents do take this argument seriously. This is why "experiments" are made that are supposed to demonstrate empirically that people would not or would only insignifi cantly reduce their working hours after the introduction of a UBI. However, these experiments do not refl ect the situation in Figure 3 but rather, at best, the situation in Figure 2 . These experiments are fi nanced "externally", and as such, the incentives for earning more than the UBI remain attractive because there is no necessity for internal fi nancing. Furthermore, these experiments always cover temporary periods. People might therefore not quit their jobs just because they receive greater income temporarily, since they would risk longer unemployment after the experiment ends.
To avoid a counterproductive redistribution requirement, some UBI proponents call for a negative income tax. This is supposed to reduce the fi nancing requirement for the needy and thereby generate only moderate cost increases compared to the status quo. The resulting income curves are shown in Figure 4 which, for simplifi cation, assumes the same tax and contribution rate as under the status quo. However, this scenario also results in strong incentives to stop working. As in the previous example, the benefi ts of full-time employment are far lower than the benefi ts of not working. This alter- In addition, a negative income tax may not prove very effective with regard to targeting the group of people in need. Not everybody with no or low income is necessarily needy according to welfare considerations, which are typically based on households. For example, from this household point of view, non-employed spouses, students or trainees living in households with incomes above the social minimum must not be regarded as needy. However, the UBI conceptually refers to individuals instead of households. A negative income tax that followed the UBI's logic would also defi ne eligibility with regard to individual income and would therefore inevitably result in additional fi nancing needs. Coupled with the decline in revenue from working less, this would force the monthly net income curve to the right of the kink point in Figure 4 to fl atten, which would make the negative behavioural effects even more likely than depicted there.
Simulations confi rm the relevance of defi ciencies with regard to fi nancing and disincentives. This is also the key argument against a UBI put forward by Colombino. 9 The German Council of Economic Experts addressed the subject in its 2007-08 annual report and estimated a fi nancial gap of €227 billion for the so-called Althaus model, 10 although this model comes with only a moderate level of basic income.
11 Similar estima- tions were presented by Bonin and Schneider and Fuest et al. 12 Part of the fi nancial gap results from the fact that the Althaus model also foresees a drastic tax reduction on top of introducing a basic income. However, according to the estimations of Bonin and Schneider, almost half of the overall impact is due to behavioural effects.
13
In addition to the incentive issues described here, there are more problems which are likely to be expected beyond those considered in the above simulations. For example, price reactions are likely if nobody can be found who is willing to perform low-wage labour. Wages for such work would have to be higher than under the status quo. Although UBI proponents see this development in a positive light, it would actually lead to a worsening of the real income situation of households, since the accompanying wage increases would be refl ected in rising consumer prices.
Conversely, if for some reason the wages for these types of jobs did not rise, the UBI would dissuade workers from performing them. Consequently, households would be forced to spend their own time on tasks they would otherwise pay other people to do, such as housework or food preparation. In both cases, these households would be worse off than before, because they would either have to spend additional money or additional time to get what they used to have.
Due to the increased tax burden, the UBI would increase incentives for illegal employment and create even more fi nancing needs. Furthermore, a UBI would destroy incentives for investing in one's education. Not only would it lead to increased unemployment among unskilled workers, but it would also enlarge the group of workers with low qualifi cations.
Finally, a UBI would serve as a tremendous pull factor for immigration, which would consequently increase fi nancing needs even further.
False arguments
Prominent UBI proponents, such as the chairman of Siemens, argue that digitalisation will not provide enough jobs for everybody in the future.
14 A signifi cant number of business However, there is no empirical basis for this argument. Technological change has accompanied mankind since well before the introduction of computers and the internet. Although it is true that technological progress has destroyed jobs, it has never led to an overall decrease in employment, but merely to structural changes in employment. Why this should be any different under digitalisation has not been convincingly explained yet. In the long run, any work that can be registered through sensors and that follows processing rules can be performed by machines. However, this does not mean that humans will become superfl uous. It only means that people will focus on whatever it is that machines cannot do in the foreseeable future. This especially concerns activities involving creativity or social interaction. Although the proliferation of the terms "artifi cial intelligence" and "machine learning" suggest that, soon, there will be no place left for human capabilities, this is only because the terms are being used incorrectly. Intelligence, in this sense, means nothing more than increased storage capacity. And machine learning is, likewise, nothing more than a label for purely syntax-bound heuristic applications. This has nothing to do with intelligence or meaningful understanding.
The fallacy of a one-sided focus on jobs lost to technology is based on an asymmetric perception. While the activities that will become superfl uous due to technological advances can be stated fairly precisely, human imagination fails when it comes to envisioning the activities and needs that could be created by freeing up resources. The fact that today's teenagers cannot imagine life without the internet is but one example of such developments. Prior to the introduction of the internet, not even experts were able to predict the revolutionary changes it would bring to consumer and communicative behaviour. For example, the 1995 assessment by Bill Gates that the internet was "just a passing fad" is legendary (though possibly apocryphal).
Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be said that neither the internal nor the external logic for a UBI proves to be convincing. The described unpredictability and the unintended side effects make a UBI an immense risk to society that can only be managed if the costs of such a redistribution remain low. However, this would counteract an essential claim of its proponents. If the UBI is not high enough to replace welfare as it exists, it would not produce enough benefi ts, such as those that could be achieved through eliminating existing welfare institutions, e.g. pension insurance, unemployment insurance and municipal welfare. If the introduction of a UBI made conditions worse than under the status quo for a signifi cant number of recipients, additional structures would have to be created to administer it without eliminating the existing welfare institutions.
The challenges associated with technological advancement consist of supporting people in actively meeting these changes, not in forcing them to be passive. The wealth of a society is created by allowing people to do what they do best. Achieving optimal resource allocation is one of the greatest challenges of every society. A UBI therefore offers the wrong incentives and tends to promote collective poverty, not only materially but also subjectively.
